Strongcertificatebindingenforcement — [upd]

Common mapping attributes include:

Here is a technical write-up on the feature.

Specifically, this is related to the mitigation logic. It changes how the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) or Local Security Authority (LSA) processes the certificate mapping. strongcertificatebindingenforcement

: Modify your Windows Enterprise CA templates to include the new SID extension.

This led to the infamous scenario, where an attacker could impersonate a privileged user simply by presenting a certificate with a spoofed SAN. Common mapping attributes include: Here is a technical

Set StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 2 on all Domain Controllers. Note: This requires at least Windows Server 2019 or Windows Server 2022 domain controllers for full compatibility, though it works on 2016 with updates.

Windows uses a protocol called to allow smart cards (or Windows Hello for Business) to authenticate to Active Directory. When a certificate is presented, the Domain Controller (DC) extracts the user’s identity from the certificate and maps it to an Active Directory account. : Modify your Windows Enterprise CA templates to

Before you flip the switch to across all your DCs, you need to audit your environment. Switching to Enforced will break authentication for any user or device that relies on weak certificate mapping.

Microsoft introduced the StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry key (located under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc ) to control this behavior. It accepts three values:

Why you need to move from "Audit" to "Enforced" to stop Kerberos relay attacks.

However, if you use with Certificate Authentication (FIDO2 or CBA), you must ensure your on-prem AD is in Enforced mode to prevent relay attacks that pivot from the cloud to on-prem.